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Justice Powell’s leading opinion in the Bakke case
stressed educational diversity over state responsibility.
However, even when “divers#’cation”fails as a goal,
the desire to overcome the effects of past
discrimination may nonetheless avail.

what Bakke leaves
to the states:
preliminary thoughts
robert m. o’neil
The resolution of the Bakke case, despite the jagged split within the
Court, provides a measure of relief to the academic community. While
many questions remain unanswered, some guidance has at long last
been provided -surely much more than the unhappy disposition of
DeFunis provided four years ago. In the early months after the decision, many efforts have been made to determine the meaning and the
scope of the decision (see McCormack, 1978). Further litigation will be
required, and is in fact already in the courts, as the vehicle for further
resolution of the many questions the Supreme Court left open.
For institutions of higher learning, major attention is likely to
focus on the “diversity” which Justice Powell has said a college or university may seek through race-conscious admissions policies. Since that
topic has been extensively covered elsewhere, nothing will be said
about it here. Instead, the focus will be on the other principal basis for
validation of preferential admission programs-a commitment to alleviate the effects of past racial discrimination. This second rationale
played no major part in Justice Powell’s opinion, not only because the
University of California Regents had not purported to make the requisite findings, but because in Powell’s view they lacked the capacity to
make them. Thus a host of questions were reserved for a later casewhat branches of government could make such findings, how explicit
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they need be, what scope should be given to findings made at an earlier
time and for a different purpose, and so on through a lengthy list of
important issues.
In order to place the “past discrimination” issue in constitutional perspective, it may be useful to review very briefly the alignment
of the Justices on the relevant questions. In fact, the Supreme Court
rendered two judgments, each by a different 5-4 majority: one, that
the Davis medical admissions program was unlawful; the other, that a
total ban on use of race (such as the California Supreme Court had
decreed) was improper. Two fairly distinct poles thus emerge along a
rather wide spectrum of possible admission policies. At one end, both
the Brennan group and the Stevens group (and presumably Justice
Powell) would have sustained certain practices -for example, the preferential allocation of minority fellowships under a special program
enacted for this precise purpose by Congress. An institution could
properly use federal funds in this way for one simple reason: Congress
enacted in 1964 the ban on which the Stevens opinion turned, and
Congress could thus presumably make exceptions to that ban. On this
basis the present Court might well uphold the so-called “ten percent
set-aside’’in the Public Works Employment Act, which has been the
subject of much litigation, with conflicting results in the lower federal
courts. This is one end of the scale: there may be other programs that
would also be acceptable to the whole Court, but this is the clearest
example.
At the other end of the spectrum there are policies which would
be held unlawful even by the Brennan group. A ractxonscious preference, for example, which cast a stigma on a minority group, would run
afoul of the Brennan opinion. Any program not designed to remedy
the effects of discrimination against the designated group- for example, a preference based on sheer whim or political influence, with no
background of exclusion or denial of opportunity- would be invalid.
Moreover, a race-consciousremedy must, in the view of the Brennan
group, be designed “to remove the disparate racial impact (the institution’s) actions might otherwise have”- that is, its policies must be part
of the solution even though they may not have been part of the problem.
This analysis brings us to the heart of the difference between
the Brennan and Powell approaches, and helps to explain why two
wings of the Court that agreed in principle on the use of race diverged
when it came to the specific admissions program. Basically, Justice
Powell believed that the University of California had no business using
race to remedy discrimination which it had not itself created-even
though blacks and Chicanos may well have been denied equal opportunity in the elementary and secondary schools of California, Chinese
may have been denied employment, and Japanese may have been dis-
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advantaged in business and land ownership. The University, in short,
could correct the injustices which it had caused, but could not use race
to cure the effects of a general condition of discrimination or exclusion.
We must then look more closely at the fourth justification
which Justice Powell offered for use of race: “The State,” he wrote,
“certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or
eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination” (1978, pp. 3-7). But the judgment required to invoke this principle was not one the University itself could make. Not only had the University of California not in fact found racial discrimination in its past
admission policies, but in Justice Powell’s view “it was in no position to
do so.” The mission of the University, he continued, “is education, not
the formulation of any legislative policy or the adjudication of particular claims of illegality.” (It is noteworthy that the Regents of the University of California are in fact a constitutional body-one of twentytwo state universities in the country which enjoys such status. Thus
their inability to make such a judgment would apply more clearly to
the greater number of public college and university governing boards
which are creatures of legislation rather than of the constitution.)
There is no clear explanation for Justice Powell’s belief that the
critical judgment must be made by some entity other than the regents
or trustees. Surely he could not be unaware of the processes by which
governing boards work. Perhaps he felt that university trustees have a
kind of self-interest that is not wholly to be trusted in such matters, or
that they are subject to kinds of pressures on the campus from which
other agencies are more isolated. There is also a strong suggestion that
such sensitive decisions should be made by a politically accountable
body, which is answerable to the electorate for the uneven dispensation
of burdens and benefits-especially where the benefit is as valuable as
admission to a state medical school. Justice Powell may also have felt
that the governing board of a single university might fail to recognize
all competing claimants, and might thus through incomplete judgment, disfavor some eligible minorities. The reasons for Justice
Powell’s distrust of the university Regents remain obscure, and need to
be probed more fully at a later time. Even the question whether, under
different conditions, the University of California Regents might be
trusted to make such sensitive decisions, may remain open because the
facts of the Bakke case did not really present it to the Court. For the
moment, however, we may accept the limitation and turn to other possible governmental sources of the critical judgment which triggers the
“past discrimination” basis of race-conscious policies.
Clearest and most obvious among the decision-makers are the
courts. A judicial finding of past racial discrimination would permit
race-conscious remedies as readily as in the school desegregation cases-
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with which Justice Powell is intimately familiar, and which he cited
with obvious approval. The higher education systems of some southeastern states may well be the object of judicial findings which not only
permit but may actually require race-conscious rernedies. Surely the
Supreme Court would not preclude the use of race to remedy a condition which a lower court has held must be corrected -- unless, of course,
the underlying judgment were to be reversed.
There is a more difficult question on the judicial side: What of
the old decrees, going back to the 1940s and 1950s--some before and
others just after Brown v. Board of Education- finding racial discrimination in certain southern state universities? The Court did not say
much about the duration of such a basis for race-conscious policies.
Justice Blackmun, in his brief separate opinion, spoke of a “transitional
inequality” and expressed the hope that a time would come when raceconscious remedies would no longer be necessary. There is no clear
benchmark by which to gauge that time. A strong argument could
therefore be made that Justice Powell’s opinion has breathed new life
into old cases like Sweatt v. Painter and the Georgia and Alabama
cases of the mid-l950s, to the extent that a justification beyond the
recent dual-system litigation may be needed.
So much for the role of the courts. The role of legislatures and
administrative bodies is less clear. What, for example, of a state higher
education coordinating board or agency? Could it make findings of
discrimination which would be acceptable where those of the university’s own governing boards might not be? Its business, too, is education, and it does not customarily engage in “adjudication of particular
claims of illegality,” to use Justice Powell’s phrase. Perhaps what he
had in mind is state antidiscrimination boards or commissions, which
know less about higher education but do have at least a quasi-judicial
role and thus might well made such findings about the admission or
financial aid policies of a particular college or university. It would now
appear that such a judgment, even in an individual grievance case,
would allow a university to do what the University of California at
Davis could not do in the absence of such findings. (Let me raise one
major caution at this point: We know how the Brennan group would
resolve such a case; since they found the Davis program valid as it was,
they would more easily have reached that conclusion after an administrative finding of discrimination. We think Justice Powell would now
join them to make a fifth. But we know nothing of the view of the
Stevens group, who scrupulously avoided going beyond the facts of the
Bakke case and the reach of Title VI. They would presumably allow
race-conscious remedies after a court had found discrimination - to
the same extent as in the public school cases-but how far they would
go with the “legislative and administrative” portion of the Powell opin-

ion is unclear. Five votes makes a court, to be sure, but it is a margin
too close for comfort on questions as portentous as these.)
Finally, we come to the possible role of the legislature. It seems
that Justice Powell-and of course the Brennan group-would permit
a college or university to use race, for example to implement a state
equal opportunity program in admission or financial aid. Even if the
statute did not in terms declare that the colleges and universities of the
state had in the past been guilty of racial discrimination-a declaration which lawmakers would understandably view with some caution
the enactment and the clear purpose of the program might meet the
Powell test. On the other hand, two federal laws which were cited in
this context-one dealing with voting rights and the other with special
bilingual education- are somewhat more explicit in finding past discrimination than is the preamble of the typical equal opportunity
scholarship law. Thus the issue is a difficult and sensitive one: To say
too little may run the risk that the program will be held legally inadequate under the Powell test; on the other hand, to say enough to
invoke that test with certainty risks admitting a culpability which legislators and university officials are loath to admit solely for the purpose
of expanding opportunity. Moreover, some such programs now extend
to groups that could not really be said to have been discriminated
against in the past by college admissions or financial aid policies. The
framing of state legislation in this area thus becomes a decliate and
demanding task, and there will probably be many more cases defining
the limits on use of race under state laws and agency rulings.
Obviously we have only scratched the surface. Since the major
attention in the Bakke opinions- the Powell and Brennan opinions at
least -was devoted to the “diversity” issue, we are left to speculate on
the possible application of the other major rationale. Even before
Bakke we would have assumed that a state college or university could
take steps to remedy past discrimination which, in the judgment of a
court, its own past exclusionist admission policies had caused. Less
clearly understood is the possible significance of administrative or legislative findings of the kind which Justice Powell has now suggested
may be constitutionally relevant. It remains to be determined to what
extent such findings- both explicit and implicit-may now serve to
validate race-conscious admission policies which would have been
vulnerable in the past. Even where “diversification”fails as a goal, the
desire to overcome the effects of past discrimination may nonetheless
avail.
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